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Abstract
With address to developing countries, this paper derives some formulae for the optimal price structure for
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incorporate features like distributional social objectives and public profit constraints in the analysis. The
model identifies different sources which may cause the optimal public price structure to deviate from
marginal cost pricing in a second-best optimum. The main result is that the optimal public price structure
includes an implicit subsidy on commodities which are consumed relatively intensely by transfer-deserving
households, whereas the same price structure involves an implicit tax on publicly provided luxuries.
Keywords: Equity, publicly provided private goods, income distribution.
JEL classification: D63, H42, 015.
Acknowledgement Expert comments to an earlier draft were provided by lulie Aslaksen, Helge Brunborg,
and Haakon Vennemo. Thanks a lot. All remaining errors are mine.
Correspondence: Klaus Mohn, Statistics Norway, Research Department, P.O.B. 8131 Dep.,
0033 Oslo. Phone: +47 - 22 86 49 21. Fax: +47 - 22 11 12 38. E-mail: klm@ssb.no

1. Introduction
The building blocks of social cost-benefit analysis have proved useful as a tool for welfare analysis
in developing countries. Originally intended for single-project analysis, over the years a vast
literature has developed, evaluating complex policy reforms when market prices are inappropriate
measures of marginal social opportunity costs (e.g. Drèze and Stern [1990]). The traditional
approach (see Dasgupta et al. [1972], Little and Mirrlees [1974]) aimed at providing estimates for
the deviations between market prices and social opportunity costs of the project's various cost and
income elements, using these estimates to construct shadow prices and marginal social opportunity
costs. These measures were then applied to evaluate the social income and cost attached to the
investment project under consideration. As optimal prices for public production are nothing but
shadow prices at a second-best welfare optimum, the theoretical tools of cost-benefit analysis are
closely related to those of public enterprise economics. The theory of the second-best has
recognized that the government's control of the income distribution is often limited. Therefore,
shadow prices should also be corrected according to their distributional impact (cf. Squire and Van
der Tak [1975]). Over the years, important contributions have been made to incorporate special
economic features to improve the theory of social cost-benefit analysis and optimal public pricing
policies. Still, the scope for redistributive pricing has been somewhat neglected, an exception being
Feldstein (1974a,b,c).
The general idea of this paper is that, at second-best optimum, the marginal social opportunity cost
of any commodity should reflect not only compensated demand effects, but also the distributional
impact of income effects from price changes. This aspect is often neglected, under the claim that
public pricing policy is not the appropriate instrument for redistribution of income. This may be
true if the public sector has access to lump-sum income transfers. With lump-sum transfers, the
income effects from any change in the *price structure may be neutralized by applying an optimal
structure for lump-sum redistribution of income, according to the social preference ordering. In
analyses meant for industrialized countries the income effects are probably also neglected under the
excuse that potential redistribution of income represents a negligible threat to the general level of
welfare. Consequently, a large part of the economic literature focusing on shadow prices and
public sector pricing ignores the impact from the public price structure on the distribution of
income, concentrating fully on efficiency matters (e.g. Hagen [1979]). Applying such methods in
analyses of developing countries may be fatal. In developing countries, the distribution of income
is typically far more unequal than in industrialized (and democratic) countries. In addition, the
income level of low-income groups is often below the poverty line. This variation in income
implies a larger scope for income redistribution, given the social preference ordering. Another
crucial difference between industrialized and developing countries regards the capacity and
efficiency of the public bureaucracy, in particular the tax administration authorities. The ability of
industrialized countries to levy non-distortionary taxes is thus far more advanced than in the
developing part of the world. In developing countries, lack of administrative capacity may exclude
also many forms of indirect taxes, making an active public sector pricing strategy an important
instrument, both for fiscal and distributional purposes.
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Optimal prices for public production can be approached as shadow opportunity costs at second-best
optimum. The theory of the second best and the techniques of cost-benefit analysis may therefore
also be applied to evaluate the optimal price structure for the public production plan. This paper
provides a formal illustration of the above ideas, the key premise being that the distributional
impact of the public sector's pricing strategy should not be overlooked, especially not in analyses of
developing countries. The reason is a conviction that the level of general welfare are more sensitive
to marginal changes in the income distribution in developing countries than in industrialized
countries. The formal framework is outlined in section 2. The implications of social distributional
objectives and binding revenue-cost constraints for the optimal public price strategy is analyzed
more closely in section 3. Some concluding remarks are offered in section 4.
2. The model
The aim of the following exposition is to relate the problem of optimal supply of public financial
resources directly to that of optimal pricing of public production. The model is built in a general
equilibrium setting, and may be thought of as a modified version of the Boiteux model (Boiteux
[1956, 1971]).
A special characteristic of our model is that the social preference ordering embodies distributional
objectives, resulting in optimal discount rates also reflecting the distributional impact of the public
price plan (see Feldstein [1972a,b,c]). In addition, we allow for profits in the private sector. This
feature allows a new source of marginal social effects of price changes. As price changes affect
private profits directly, the optimal public pricing strategy should depend on the marginal social
valuation of these changes in lump sum income for households.
Moreover, the producer of the public sector in our model is facing a binding revenue-cost
constraint ( fie). This public profit constraint is bounded from below by break-even pricing, and
from above by profit-maximizing behaviour. In practice, the public profit constraint may be a
result of prices, qualities and a variety of other exogenous variables. However, the derivations
below are restricted to the case where this revenue-cost constraint is exogenously fixed.
Three types of agents are included in the model. They are: H price-taking households and J
competitive producers, and the public sector. The agents' time horizon is bounded from above, as
the number of time periods is set to T. The number of goods is N+1, and good number 0 is treated
as a numeraire ( po
 = 1 ). The public sector produces private goods in competition with the private
producers, and controls a subset 13 E p of the prices of private commodities. The government faces
a restricted optimization problem, whereby welfare is maximized through appropriate policies.
But before we treat this optimization problem explicitly, the behaviour of each type of agent
requires a brief introduction. Household h faces prices p, money income mil, and the chosen net
consumption plan is given by:
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aV h
X h (P,M h ) -ap (Plinh)
where Vh is the indirect utility function, solving the utility maximization problem:
h	 h, h	 h‘ I 	 h _	 h}V h (p,m h ) =max fu =u	 ,m ) px -m
xh
Direct utility is denoted by uh( xh , Mh )• Positive values for xi are assigned to consumer goods,
whereas negative values represent supply of consumer services, such as labour. Thus, the net
consumption plan contains both positive and negative entries, and the direct price derivatives vary
also by sign. Summation over all consumers yields:
X E. Ex h
h
The lump-sum money income of consumer h (M il ) is not completely exogenous, and has two
sources. First, there is the lump-sum transfer rh from the government, and second, there is lump-
sum profit income for shareholders in private production, yielding for the total lump-sum income:
hh
= r +E whip
where J h
 represents household h's share in profits from firm j. The distribution of income
depends in this way on the overall income of the share-holders in the private production activities.
Profit maximization is the leading guide in private production. With notation corresponding to
private consumption, the net production plan for firm j may be represented by:
(5) all' (p) Yi ( p) =
ap
where EP(p) is a profit function solving the profit maximization problem:
(6) MP) =max {fli 	 f' (y0
Y i
(2)
(3)
(4)
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and yi is the vector of inputs and outputs, and fi is a net production function, characterizing the
technology of firm j. The aggregate net supply plan is given by:
For market clearing to hold for all goods, we assume that public supply continuously adjusts to
clear any excess demand. This implies that market clearing is secured, and the assumption may be
stated as:
(6) E x h (p,m h ) -E yi(p) X -y = Z
h
For efficiency in public production, the following equation must hold:
(7) g(z) =0
where z is the net production plan of the public sector and where g may be thought of as some
implicit production function. It is also assumed that the public sector is constrained by some form
of exogenous income requirements. In principle, this may be positive or negative. The public
sector's profit constraint ( LP ) is considered exogenous, and we simply state the following for the
public sector's restriction on profits:
(8) pz
For simplicity of exposition, let v = ( v1 , v2 ,	 , vh „ vH ) be defined as the vector describing
all the consumers' indirect utility. Then assume that the government's preferences are represented
by a general Bergson-Samuelson welfare function of the type:
(9) w =w(v)
Observe that this specification does not exclude preferences over income-distribution, although
these are not explicitly formulated.
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Without direct control of the income distribution, the public sector will have to consider also the
distributional impact when choosing the optimal price strategy, an aspect that may well be analyzed
within the described setting. With a public sector controlling a subset fi ep of the total set of
prices, a constrained optimization problem can now be constructed, whereby the government
maximizes the welfare function (9), given the constraints that individually secure market clearing,
efficiency in public production, and fiscal constraints to be satisfied:
(10) max .w = w(v)(p, r , z)
subject to:
X -y
g(z) =0
pz =1. -T
The first constraint simply states that all markets must clear, and it is assumed that public
production adjusts to eliminate every excess demand. The second constraint is introduced to
restrict the public sector to efficient production, whereas the third constraint says that budgets of
the public firm has to equalize some exogenously fixed profit constraint. The variables under
public control are the prices included in the vector p, and the exogenous lump-sum income element
rh. These measures are set to maximize the social welfare function given the above constraints.
The Lagrangian for the welfare-maximization problem in equation (10) may be formulated as:
L =w(v) - a[x - y -z] - fl[g(z)] - [IT -pz]
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Shadow prices of the commodity-specific market-clearing conditions are given by a, shadow prices
for the public profit constraint is represented by 13, whereas y is the shadow price of the profit
constraint in the public sector. The first-order conditions are:
(15) aw  avh
arh	 avhamh	 i	 'am h
a ax ih
	  = b h =0	 h EH
E  aw  av h E E o hi b h ani 
afi k 	h äv" afi kh	 h j	 afik
(16)
ax h 
-E ay: I + yzk =0
	 fi	 13a E 	 P k e
	h afi k
	afik
aL 	 ag(17)	 = a i +	 - yp i =0	 i E N
az	 a z
Equation (15) is the first-order condition for optimal lump-sum redistribution of income. This
condition states that for each consumer the sum of all income effects should equal the marginal
social valuation of these income effects. Thus, at a second best optimum, income effects has no
distributional significance. The explanation behind this result lies in the access to lump-sum
income transfers, allowing full concentration on compensated demand effects.
Equation (16) gives an optimal price structure, and social preferences for income equality are
reflected through the first two terms on the left-hand side. The first term represents the direct
effects upon consumption and household utility from a price change, whereas the second is working
through the change in lump-sum profit income, following such changes.
Equation (17) is the condition for an efficient production plan in the public sector. With this system
of tools we are ready to analyze some different aspects determining the optimal public price
structure in an economy with social objectives regarding the distribution of income.
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3. Optimal public pricing strategies
As argued in the introduction, distributional aspects are likely have a more important role in the
social welfare function in developing countries than in the rest of the world. The implication is
that distributional objectives deserve an corresponding role also in the general public pricing policy.
The following exposition attempts to illustrate this idea in the technical framework presented above.
Feldstein (1972a,b,c) was one of the first economists to point out the inadequacy of the standard
compensated Ramsey-Boiteux rules. Feldstein's work is concentrated on deriving rules for optimal
price structures, taking explicitly account of the distributional impact of income effects.
To illustrate the main ideas, we assume that the public sector has no possibilities of redistributing
income by means of lump-sum transfers. This implies that all the emerging demand effects will
have to include income effects as well as substitution effects, leading us to speak in terms of
uncompensated demand effects. In our model, excluding income distribution as a direct policy
instrument means that the first set of first-order conditions is neglected, as equations (16) and (17)
are the only ones that will have to hold. Substituting (17) into (16) yields:
„-,aw avh 
-FEE O hl b h 	
h	 h aP k
	j h	 afik
(18)
- E[fi--- YP i l	 a p, k -E a ,,az iag 	ax ih
To eliminate the dual variable p, we define:
P k
ay ij
	 1 yzk
(19)
where:
ag
0	 azo
ai is the normalized shadow-cost of commodity i, and ? is the normalized shadow-cost of the
public profit-constraint. Using these definitions, and solving the normalized first-order condition
from equation (17) yields for the numeraire :
(21) ao + ? = 1
Since the shadow price of commodity 0 is positive at a constrained optimum, this implies that 7" E
MM. This is an attractive property, and can be used to interpret the optimality conditions for the
price structure in terms of weighted averages. The weights of these averages will depend on the
shadow prices of the private producers and consumers, and of the public profit constraint. As ? is
increasing in the exogenous profit constraint, it may be taken to reflect the public budgetary slack.
For simplicity of exposition, and to facilitate a convenient interpretation of the first-order conditions
we define:
(22) Ah	 aw 1a v h fi g()
as a normalized measure of marginal social welfare associated with an increise in income for
consumer h. Thus, a government who is concerned about the distribution of income will choose a
welfare function where 2 1' is negatively correlated with the income and utility level. Taking into
account that the marginal cost in public production public production of commodity i may be
written':
(23)
The first-order conditions for an optimal price structure in the public sector may now be restated
as:
(24) E c	 E ax ih
H af) k
ayfl
ai3 k	
yZ k -	 av h
afik
ohi
ap
 k
'If yi
 is an input, cig may be interpreted as the marginal rate of transformation.
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Further simplification is achieved by adding ( 1 - ý )L'ipt Th(dr/ch) - Tidy/lc:1N] on both sides of
equation (23). Rearranging now allows an interpretation of the optimal price structure in terms of
public price-cost differentials:
ih 	 ,JI 	a 
E (cig-p,)	
ax 	 ay
E 	 = rz k +(/ - ?)E E P, 371
h afik
	 afik
	 1	 .1	 afik
(25)
[	
h
aVh	 aXi
- i
 ith-äTi:-(1 --f)Pi afik ÷ jh 	 ap
 k
Equation (25) illustrates that the social opportunity cost public production at a second-best optimum
depends on social preferences for income distribution, the marginal cost of public production, the
public profit-constraint, and on repercussions through reallocation of resources in the private sector.
This means that the social opportunity cost of commodities deviate from it's marginal cost of
production whenever there are distributional objectives, price distortions in the private sector, or the
public sector faces a binding profit constraint.
To simplify even further, we assume that the optimal public price plan secure that private producers
act as if they were competitive price-takers operating under constant returns to scale. This
assumption is possible even with market imperfections, because manipulation of product prices is
equivalent to lump-sum taxes on private profits (cf. Diamond and Mirrlees [1976], Drèze and Stern
[1987]). An optimal price structure in the public sector is therefore equivalent to an optimal lump
sum tax structure on private profits. However, we implicitly assume that price-distortions are absent
in sectors out of public control, or alternatively, that the public sector controls all prices. For an
exhaustive analysis of the general case, see Hagen (1979), Bös (1989).
Recalling that yi is the net supply plan of private producers, zero private profits must imply:
ay /r p 	  = 0
k
This must be true by the homogeneity properties of the profit function, and the implication is that
second term on the right-hand side of equation (24) vanishes. To focus explicitly on distributional
aspects of the public pricing strategy, let us examine the last square-bracketed term of equation (24)
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somewhat more closely. The first terms in these brackets represent the social value of a marginal
price change of commodity k for household h. Applying Roy's identity on this term gives:
aV h 
	E
 Ah
 äv'	Ah x
k am h
h	 a 13 lc	 h
Then, following Feldstein (1972a,b,c), and Bös (1989), we define a distributional characteristic as a
weighted sum of household demand shares:
h
E Ah  av h X k
	h 	
am h x k
The social valuation of an increase in the supply of xk is higher the higher is its share in the
consumption by transfer deserving households. This idea is captured by Ok.
Observe that the welfare weights of this distributional characteristic is decreasing in household
income, as the marginal utility of money income for well-behaving households is negatively
correlated with their share in total consumption expenditures. Further, the distributional
characteristic of equation (25) will typically be higher for a necessity than for a luxury. Public
pricing policies taking advantage of this kind of distributional characteristic is commonly referred
to as Feldstein pricing, as Feldstein (1972a) was the first economist to introduce the concept of
distributional characteristics in public sector pricing.
According to the Slutsky equations for private consumption demand it must be true for any change
in the price structure:
ax .h [	 h13X i aX .
u	
h
	EE 	 P	 1 EEPix kh aml h
	
i h	 aP k	 i h	 P k	 h
X kh
This property will be applied to reduce the second element of the square-bracketed term on the
right-hand side of equation (35). This term may now be written (1-f )xk. Finally, we define:
aZ h
	ay E "
i
afik	 h afik	 J aP k
(25)
as the uncompensated demand response for public production following a price change. Now we
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are ready to summarize the total social valuation of a marginal price change, including the
distributional impact.
The optimality condition of equation (24) may now be written:
(26)	 E (p i -cig) 	=-(1 -4)x k - t(z k -x k ) -
aPk
E ehibhvik
Equation (26) represents the optimal pricing rule for the public sector, in the presence of
competition with private producers, binding revenue-cost constraint, and social preferences over the
distribution of income. The optimal pricing rule illustrates that deviations from marginal cost
pricing in the public sector are defendable if the public sector is acting according to distributional
objectives. Ignoring repercussions from private production, means that the two last terms on the
right hand side of equation (26) cancel, and we are allowed to focus on the effects caused by the
distributional social objectives:
az(27) E
 (P 	=	 - cx k
afik
Observe first that for this special case, the optimal mark-up for public production will be positive
for 0 < (fik
 < /, and negative for ok > /. This means that the public sector should employ its
market power actively to generate extra profits from luxury goods. These profits should in turn
cover the loss generated by negative mark-ups on goods that are consumed relatively intensely by
transfer-deserving households. Accordingly, we see that if xk is a luxury, the optimal mark-up is
higher than in the monopoly case. On the other hand, if xk is a necessity, the optimal mark-up is
lower than marginal costs.
If the price-cost differentials are interpreted in terms of a set of tax rates, the analogy to standard
optimal taxation rules of the Ramsey-rules becomes clear. To illuminate this point, it is possibly to
derive an inverted elasticity rule also for the case of distributional pricing, although this rule is
somewhat more complex than the standard Ramsey-rules. For the described case, the optimality
condition in equation (26) implies:
(28) El'i1a= - ( 1 - 4)
where pi is the mark-up factor for commodity i:
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pi-ci
=
p i
and
az i p k
k	 —
aPk z,
is the set of uncompensated elasticities of excess demand for commodity i. It follows that the
public sector in this case should act as a profit-maximizing monopolist, inflating all demand
elasticities by the commodity-specific factor //(44-/). This will generally imply a positive mark-up
for luxuries and a negative mark-up for necessities. Equation (28) illustrates that there might well
be situations where distributional aims dominate in the determination of the optimal public price
plan. However, this result depends on the extent to which other measures can be applied for an
improvement in the distribution of income. Accordingly, various types of shortcomings of the tax
administration make this case especially interesting for developing countries.
The second and the last term on the right-hand side of equation (26) reflects effects caused by the
interaction between private producers and the public sector. Hence, both these terms cancel in the
case when goods with publicly controlled prices are neither demanded nor supplied by private
producers. When interaction with private producers take place, the second term on the right side of
equation (26) reflects the effects on the price structure from the public profit constraint. This effect
applies only if there is competition with private producers in the supply of zk-
Isolating the effect from the second term on the right-hand side of equation (26) implies for the
optimal price-structure:
E (P, C) . _L =- y(z k -x k )
k
Recalling from the market-clearing condition that yk
 = xk - zk, the following elasticity rule may be
derived:
E Pi i k	 kl
k
(31)
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In this case, deviations from marginal-cost-pricing take place not only because of distributional
aims, but also because the profit constraint receives a more prominent place in the pricing rule,
because of the competition between private producers and the public sector. Equation (31)
illustrates how a large private sector reduces the possibility of sovereign public pricing policies,
thus causing discipline in the exploitation of public market power. The effect is at its maximum
absolute value if the public sector's profit constraint is binding ( = / ), and is reduced for any
degree of public budget slack ( 0 < f < / ). An intuitive interpretation of this result is that
competition between private producers and the public sector becomes more important, the more
profitably the publicly provided goods can be priced. A high binding revenue-cost constraint
means that the public sector may price its production far beyond marginal costs. This pattern is
revealed in equation (31) by the effect from f, which is typically increasing in the magnitude of
the public revenue-cost differential frg.
The last term on the right-hand side of the optimal pricing rule in equation (26) reflects the
repercussions from profits among private producers towards private consumption, as some
consumers are engaged in productive activities, as stock-holders, entrepreneurs or peasants. With
constant returns to scale, one may object that the production plan of any private firm breaks even at
shadow prices, leaving zero profits (Diamond and Mirrless [1976]). However, this result also holds
for positive profits in the private sector, provided that these profits are fully or optimally taxed.
Our assumptions therefore imply that the optimal price structure of public production is equivalent
to a set of lump-sum profit taxes, levied on private producers to make them behave as if they were
operating under constant returns to scale. Isolating this private profits effect of equation (26) yields
for the optimal price structure:
(32) az.E (pi	 =-E E O hl b hi
k 	hj
Again, we may divide by zk on both sides, to derive an elasticity rule also for this case:
E ilik = - E
i	 il 	Zk
where Y E Ehbhehi represents the social valuation of a marginal change in lump-sum taxation of
profits in firm j. Equation (33) shows the impact on the public sector's pricing strategy in the case
where income effects are generated because of repercussions to households from profits in the
private sector. Further, this effect is equivalent to a lump-sum tax on private profits.
(33)
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According to equations (26) and (33), the optimal pricing strategy of the public sector should
therefore be influenced by the ownership structure in competing private firms. This effect will
typically be influential for household production or for small-scale agriculture and industry, as these
are activities often undertaken by so-called transfer-deserving households. On the other hand, the
optimal price plan of equation (33) includes an implicit profit tax on firms mainly owned by high-
income consumers. The third term on the right-hand side of equation (26) is closely related to the
net distributional characteristic of Drèze and Stern (1987).
As the optimal discount rate for public investments is nothing but the marginal social opportunity
cost of investment expenditure in the public sector, the pricing rule in equation (26) may also be
interpreted as a rule for the socially optimal return on investments undertaken by the public sector.
First, equation (26) states that investment projects which, directly or indirectly, generate income for
transfer-deserving households should be offered a lower price of capital services than projects
favouring high-income groups. This in turn implies that projects benefitting low-income groups
should be subject to milder cost-benefit tests than projects providing extra income for average- or
high-income groups. In practice, the idea has relevance for public investments in the agricultural
sector, public building society loans, and investment directed towards improvement in the
infrastructure for transfer deserving households.
Second, if the
 government faces a binding budget constraint, the optimal pricing strategy involves a
mark-up on the marginal social costs of capital services. Paying attention to profit constraints, and
neglecting distributional aspects, will thus favour projects were high incomes tend to flow in over
a few years, whereas long-term projects with a somewhat modest annual income more easily will
be rejected.
For a given net present value, the optimal price plan for publicly provided capital services will
favour projects where the surplus tend to descend over time to projects where the income profile
rises over time. Thus, if public financial institutions reveal a myopic investment behaviour, this
might be an optimal response to tight profit-constraints. This is highly relevant for developing
countries, where common accusations against the governments have included impatience in the
design of investment policies for low-income groups.
In the absence of preferences for income redistribution and public profit-constraints, the optimality
condition of equation (26) simplifies to:
E (pi -c ig)	 =0P k
(34)
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This implies that the public sector should price its production only for efficiency motives. However,
an exogenously given discriminating tax system may cause divergence between consumer and
producer prices. Before we conclude, the implications of such a tax system of the optimal pricing
strategy will be offered a brief comment. This will illustrate how our model relates to alternative
approaches to public sector pricing, where the tax system is take as exogenous (e. g. Sandmo and
Drèze [1971]). Using the market-clearing condition, ignoring cross-elasticities, and restricting
ourselves to the case with only one private producer, we may manipulate equation (34) to read:
ax,
aPk 
az,
aP k 
ay , 
+ C i aPk 
az i
aPk    
where ck
 is the marginal cost of producing commodity yk in the private sector. The bracketed
expressions sum up to one, allowing us to state the optimal public pricing strategy as a weighted-
average rule. Define:
ax .
aPk
aZi
aP k      
(1 - 0 i )  
ay ,
aP k    
az     
aPk       
With perfectly competitive markets, the consumers will face prices equal to their marginal rates of
substitution ( MRSio ), and the marginal cost of private production will reflect the marginal rate of
transformation ( MRTio ). This implies that the optimal public pricing strategy is represented by a
weighted average, involving the marginal valuation of the commodity among consumers and
producers, as equation (34) now implies:
(36)	 c = O i MRS i 0 + ( 1 -0 i ) MRTi 0
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More generally, with discriminating taxes, the optimal price of the public good is give as a
weighted average between consumer prices and producer prices. Through public production
activities, resources are displaced from consumption and private production. The weights of the
pricing rule in equation (36) reflects the allocation of these crowding-out effects from public
production activities. If all resources are displace from private consumption, Oi = 0, and for the
case that private production could replace all public production activities, Oi = /. Observe also that
a non-distortionary tax system would secure the equalization of marginal rates of substitution to the
marginal rate of transformation. In this case, the optimal public price would equal private marginal
costs. The pricing rule of equation (36) is also equivalent to the optimal public discount rate rules
demonstrated in a related intertemporal framework by Sandmo and Dréze (1972).
4. Concluding remarks
Our technical discussion has provided us with a set of second-best policy rules, in which the public
price structure in general depends on the social valuation of private consumption. Thus, optimal
public pricing policy involves an implicit subsidy on commodities which are consumed relatively
intensely by transfer-deserving households. Thus, necessities provided by the public sector should
be priced below marginal costs. On the other hand, the same strategy includes an implicit tax on
commodities which are consumed mainly by high-income households, relatively speaking. This
means that publicly provided luxuries should be priced above marginal cost pricing.
The efficiency of the pricing policy depends the extent of competition between the public sector
and private producers in the actual markets. If the public sector is a monopolist, full attention may
be payed to the redistributive policies. With private producers, the public sector commitment to
redistributive pricing is falling in the private sector's market share. The ownership of private firms
may also be of relevance for the optimal public pricing strategy, as the marginal social value of
price changes depends on the social valuation of marginal changes in private profits. If private
firms are owned by transfer-deserving households, the marginal social valuation of profits is higher
than if private production is run by high-income households.
Most developing countries are plagued by severe income inequality. For a given set of social
preferences, this makes the need for policies to redistribute income far more urgent in developing
countries than in the industrialized world. At the same time, the ability of the public administration
in developing countries to levy non-distortionary taxes is clearly insufficient. This situation gives
the public pricing policy a prominent role for income redistribution. This paper has offered a
technical discussion of the ideas within the framework of a slightly modified general equilibrium
model. The model provides second-best rules for public pricing policy which are in consonance
with the ideas stated in the introduction. Thus, there are cases when the public sector should use its
market power actively in the purpose of redistributing income. Moreover, these situations are likely
to be more frequent in developing countries than in the industrialized part of the world.
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